Frank Cameron Jackson
Frank Cameron Jackson (fæddur 1943) er ástralskur heimspekingur. Hann er prófessor í heimspeki við Australian National University en var einnig forstöðumaður Rannsóknarseturs háskólans í félagsvísindum. Frá 2007 er hann reglulega gistiprófessor við Princeton-háskóla í Bandaríkjunum. Rannsóknir Jacksons eru einkum á sviði hugspeki, þekkingarfræði, frumspeki og siðspeki.
| Frank Cameron Jackson | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Persónulegar upplýsingar | |
| Fæddur | 1943 |
| Svæði | Vestræn heimspeki |
| Tímabil | Heimspeki 20. aldar, Heimspeki 21. aldar |
| Skóli/hefð | Rökgreiningarheimspeki |
| Helstu ritverk | Perception: A Representative Theory; „Epiphenomenal Qualia“; „What Mary didn't Know“ |
| Helstu kenningar | Perception: A Representative Theory; „Epiphenomenal Qualia“; „What Mary didn't Know“ |
| Helstu viðfangsefni | hugspeki, frumspeki, þekkingarfræði, siðspeki |
Helstu ritverk
breytaBækur
breyta- (1977) Perception: A Representative Theory (Cambridge University Press).
- (1987) Conditionals, Basil Blackwell.
- (1996) The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (Basil Blackwell) (ásamt David Braddon-Mitchell).
- (1997) From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford University Press).
- (1998) Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays (Routledge).
Greinar
breyta- (1975) „Grue“, Journal of Philosophy LXXI: 113-131.
- (1979) „On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals“, Philosophical Review LXXXVIII (4): 565-589.
- (1982) „Epiphenomenal Qualia“, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127): 127-136.
- (1982) „Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories“, Philosophical Studies 42: 209-225. (ásamt R. Pargetter og E.W. Prior.)
- (1984) „Weakness of Will“, Mind XCIII (369): 1-18.
- (1984) „Petitio and the Purpose of Arguing“, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1): 26-36.
- (1985) „On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation“, Mind XCIV (374): 177-196.
- (1986) „Oughts, Options, and Actualism“, Philosophical Review XCV: 233-255 (ásamt R. Pargetter).
- (1986) „What Mary didn't Know“, Journal of Philosophy 83 (5): 291-295.
- (1988) „Functionalism and Broad Content“, Mind XCVII (387): 381-400 (ásamt Philip Pettit).
- (1990) „In Defence of Folk Psychology“, Philosophical Studies 59 (1): 31-54 (ásamt Philip Pettit).
- (1991) „Decision-theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection“, Ethics 101 (3): 461-482.
- (1998) „A Problem for Expressivism“, Analysis 58 (4): 239-51 (ásamt Philip Pettit).
- (2001) „Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation“, Philosophical Review 110 (3): 315-360 (ásamt David J. Chalmers).
- (2003) „Mind and Illusion“, hjá Anthony O'Hear (ritstj.), Minds and Persons (Cambridge University Press): 251-271.
